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In conclusion it may be said that the vagueness of the Statute itself
and the constantly varying fact situations which arise make impossible
the development of adequate rules as to what constitutes a sufficient
writing. Although the cases are replete with judicial utterances that
the Statute must be rigidly enforced, the court at times has been extremely lenient in upholding seemingly incomplete memoranda. This
occasional laxity may be explained in two ways. There may be unusual
hardship in the particular case. Or, the court may be seeking an indirect means of avoiding the strict North Carolina rule regarding part
performance.2 1
STATON P. WILLIAMS.
Workmen's Compensation-Notice to Employer-Filing of ClaimsAction Under Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Employee was killed in an accident in December, 1929, while in defendant's employ. Defendant was a self-insurer and reported the accident to the industrial commission at once, offering to pay the claim.
Plaintiff, the employee's administrator, without filing a claim, notified
the defendant and the commission that he would proceed under the Federal Employers' Liability Act rather than the Workmen's Compensation
Act. After various rulings and an appeal under the Federal Act1 the
plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 1935 the plaintiff petitioned for
an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act and requested a hearing before the industrial commission. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the claim was not barred by the one year statute of
limitations as it was pending before the industrial commission during
2
the entire period.
Generally, before the injured employee or his personal representative
can recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act he
must comply with the statute in two respects. First, he must notify
the employer of the accident either within a limited time after the injury or as soon thereafter as is practicable.3 While the notice is usually

'North

Carolina does not allow -part performance of the contract to take the

contract without the statute. Hall
48. v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104

(1904); (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv.
"Hanks v. Utilities Co., 204 N. C. 155, 167 S. E. 560 (1933).

'Hanks v. Utilities Co., 210 N. C. 312, 186 S. E. 252 (1936).

' The statutes vary in different jurisdictions.
ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §7568 (notice

Only a few are listed below.

to employer within 5 days; no

compensation if after 90 days); ARiz. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §1446
(injury to be reported at once); GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison, 1933) §114-303 (notice immediately; barred after 30 days unless reasonable excuse and employer
shown not to be prejudiced by delay) ; IoWA CODE (1935) §1383 (notice in 15
days; if in 30 days, not barred except as to extent employer was prejudiced; bar
absolute after 90 days) ; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll; Baldwin's Rev., 1936) §§4914,
4915 (notice as soon as practicable); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081
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given in writing few states rule that written notice is a condition precedent to recovery.4 The employer's actual knowledge of the injury5
or verbal notice to him 6 or his agent 7 has been held sufficient. Second,
the employee or his personal representative must file a claim with the
industrial commission or board having jurisdiction of such proceedings,
within a limited time, usually one year, from the date of injury or
death. 8 A failure to follow this provision usually bars recovery0 as the
statute is generally held to be mandatory.' 0 That which is necessary to
constitute a sufficient filing and a sufficient claim is not clear but it has
been held that a letter setting out in detail the facts of the accident" or
(dd) (notice as soon as practicable; barred after 30 days unless reasonable excuse and employer shown not to be prejudiced by the delay) ; TENN. CODE (Shannon, 1932) §6872 (notice as soon as practicable; barred after 30 days, unless
cause shown); UTAH Rav. STAT. ANN. (1933) §42-1-92 (notice in 48 hours,
or penalty;
barred after one year).
4
Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 219 App. Div. 495, 220 N. Y. Supp. 420
(1927) (failure to give employer written notice of death caused reversal of compensation award) ; Beech v. Keicher, 154 Tenn. 329, 289 S. W. 519 (1926) (written
notice of accident condition precedent to recovery notwithstanding employer's actual knowledge).
'Graver Corp. v. State Industrial Comm., 114 Okla. 140, 244 Pac. 438 (1926);
Dep't of Game and Inland Fisheries v. Joyce, 147 Va. 89, 136 S. E. 651 (1927).
' Cook County v. Industrial Comm., 327 Ill. 79, 158 N. E. 405 (1927) ; Hughes
v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245 N. Y. 201, 156 N. E. 665 (1927).
"Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co. v. Foote, 231 Ala. 275, 164 So. 379 (1935)
(report to employer's surgeon held sufficient); Wilson v. Clement Co., 207
N. C. 541, 177 S. E. 797 (1935) (compensation denied on other grounds) ; Ware
v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 153 Tenn. 144, 281 S. W. 927 (1926).
'ALA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §7570 (claim in one year) ; ARIz. CODE ANN.
(Struckmeyer, 1928) §1447 (claim in one year); GA. CODE ANN. (Harrison,
1933) §114-305 (claim in one year); IowA CODE (1935) §1386 (claim in two
years); Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll; Baldwin's Rev., 1936) §4914 (claim in one
year); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081 (if) (claim in one year) ; TENN.
CODE (Shannon, 1932) §6874 (claim in one year) ; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933)
§42-1-64 (death claims barred after one year).
'Hilty v. Fairbanks Exploration Co., 82 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936);
White v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 41 Ga. App. 514, 153 S. E. 574 (1930);
Tricomo v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Mich. 541, 267 N. W. 731 (1936) ;Kaplan v.
Kaplan Knitting Mills, 221 App. Div. 484, 224 N. Y. Supp. 262 (1927); Wilson v. Clement Co., 207 N. C. 541, 177 S. E. 797 (1935) ; State ex rel. Carr v.
Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 130 Ohio St. 185, 198 N. E. 480 (1935); Menna v.
Mathewson, 48 R. I. 310, 137 Atl. 907 (1927). Cf. Pacific Employers' Insurance Co. v. Pillsbury, 14 F. Supp. 156 (D. C. Cal., 1936) (failure to file claim
within statutory time held to be no bar to recovery under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act) ; In re Pahlke, 53 P. (2d) 1177 (Idaho,
1936) (state barred from recovering non-dependent compensation where claim was
not filed within the statutory time).
" Bushnell v. Industrial Board, 276 I1. 262, 114 N. E. 496 (1916); Kalucki
v. American Car and Foundry Co., 200 Mich. 604, 166 N. W. 1011 (1918);
Chmielewska v. Butte and Superior Mining Co., 81 Mont. 36, 261 Pac. 616 (1927);
Wray v. Woollen Mills, 205 N. C. 782, 172 S. E. 487 (1934); 2 SCHNAEIDER,
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAw (2d ed. 1932) §545.
'Williams v. Cities Service Gas Co., 139 Kan. 166, 30 P. (2d) 97 (1934)
Roach v. Durham Const. Co., 52 S. W. (2d) 593 (Mo., 1932); Higgenbotham
v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 155 Okla. 264, 9 P. (2d) 15 (1932); Barwin v. Independent School Dist. of Sioux Falls, 61 S. D. 275, 248 N. W. 257
(1933) ; Hardy v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 58 P. (2d) 15 (Utah, 1936). Contra:
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an oral report to the commission 12 is enough. In North Carolina mere
notice by the employer is an adequate compliance with the statute. 3a
The courts have generally ruled that a common law action by the injured
14
After
employee for damages is neither a claim nor notice of a claim.
the accident is once reported and the commission recognizes the claim,
5
its jurisdiction attaches and continues until the case is decided.'
In the principal case the plaintiff denied the validity of the Compensation Act and sought recovery under the Federal Act, waiting five years
before making a formal claim for compensation under the State Act.
The employer's notice, upon which the commission assumed jurisdiction,
was held to be sufficient to preserve the rights of the plaintiff. Since
the commission cannot dispose of a case except by some award, order,
or judgment, final in its effect, 16 it follows that the plaintiff was entitled to a hearing. The bringing of the action under the Federal Act
did not constitute an election of remedies or estop the plaintiff from
thereafter asserting his rights under the Workmen's Compensation
7
Act.'
The court by its liberal interpretation of the statute reading, "The
right to compensation under this article shall be forever barred unless a
claim be filed with the industrial commission within one year after the
accident . .. ., is departing from the apparent intent of the legislature. However, the court is following the general tendency of promotHiggins v. Heine Boiler Co., 328 Mo. 493, 41 S.W. (2d) 565 (1931); Murphy

(2d) 1035 (1931).
v. Burlington Overall Co., 225 Mo. App. 866, 34 S.W.
"Duford v. Escanaba Veneer Co., 246 Mich. 191, 224 N. W. 390 (1929);

France v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 186 S. E. 601 (W. Va.,
1936). Contra: Murphy v. Burlington Overall Co., 225 Mo. App. 866, 34 S. W.
(2d) 1035 (1931). Cf. Yeaver v. State Compensation Comm., 113 W. Va. 257,
167 S. E. 617 (1933) (commission electing to investigate claim in 'which no report
had been filed, must dispose of cases on merits); Cole v. State Compensation
Comm., 113 W. Va. 579, 169 S.E. 165 (1933).
'Hardison v. Hampton and Sons, 203 N. C. 187, 165 S. E. 355 (1932) ; Hanks
v. Utilities Co., 210 N. C. 312, 186 S. E. 252 (1936).
Gas & Fuel Co. v. Thomas, 87 Colo. 486, 288 Pac. 1051 (1930);
'Greeley
Pallanck v. Donovan, 109 Conn. 469, 147 Atl. 14 (1929) ; Cruse v. Chicago, R. I.
and P. Ry. Co., 140 Kan. 704, 38 P. (2d) 672 (1934) ; Schild v. Pere Marquette
R. Co., 200 Mich. 614, 166 N. W. 1018 (1918). Contra: Ackerson v. National
Zinc Co., 96 Kan. 781, 153 Pac. 530 (1915).
'Kennedy v. Industrial Accident Comm., 50 Cal. App. 184, 195 Pac. 267
(1921); Choctaw Portland Cement Co. v. Lamb, 79 Okla. 109, 189 Pac. 750
(1920).
"0Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shilling, 259 S. W. 236 (Texas, 1923);
Todd v. Southern Casualty Co., 18 S.W. (2d) 695 (Texas, 1929).
"'McLead v. Southern Pac. Co., 64 Utah 409, 231 Pac. 440 (1924) (bringing
action in another state under Federal Employers' Liability Act held not evidence of abandonment of claim for compensation) ; Utah Idaho Cent. Ry. Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 84 Utah 364, 35 P. (2d) 842 (1934) (plaintiff who misconceived his remedy and brought action under Federal Employers' Liability Act
held not estopped from pursuing legal remedy under State Workmen's Compensation Laws).
IsN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §8081 (ff)a.
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ing the remedial nature of workmen's compensation laws. As most
accidents are reported 19 the employees or their personal representatives
will hereafter usually be privileged to institute experimental suits before seeking compensation under the Act. How can this undesirable
situation be met? Though the commission has the power to call a
hearing on its own motion 20 or on the motion of either party, 2 1 the burden of bringing contestable claims to a speedy settlement should not be
placed on the commission, the employer, or the insurance carrier. To
protect the employer and the insurance carrier from dormant claims an
amendment is proposed 22 by which the employee or his personal representative would be compelled to take action on the claim within one year
after its filing or his rights thereunder would be forever barred. This
proposed amendment would not prejudice the rights of the plaintiff
where he is seeking recovery under the Federal Act, as acceptance of
the state compensation is not a bar to recovery under the Federal Act.28
A further protection is given the plaintiff by the 1933 Amendment
which allows the employee or his personal representative one year in
which to commence an action at law in the event of an adverse judgment
24
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

E. C.

SANDERSON.

"The employer is under a statutory duty to report all injuries. N. C. CoDE
ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§8081(vvv) a, 8081 (vvv)e.
' The Commission is not expressly given power to call a hearing on its own
motion, but it is given express authority to make rules and regulations for carryout -the provisions of the Act. N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §801(jjj)a.
The commission claims to have the power. Rules and Regulations, no. 14. See
American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Huffman, 187 N. E. 410 (Ind. App.,
1933), where the compensation board was allowed to order that additional parties be joined. Hence it seems that the commission would not be exceeding its
authority by acting on its own motion.
' 1N. C. CoDe ANN. (Michie, 1935) 8081(mmm).
' Following is a proposal for the Amendment, N. C. Coon ANN. (Michle,
1935) §8081(ff)a: "The right to compensation under this Act shall be forever
barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year
after the accident, and if death results from the accident, unless a claim be
filed with the Commission within one year thereafter: and all claims upon which
action is not taken under this statute by the claimant within one year after the date
of filing shall be forever barred."
' New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546,
61 L. ed. 1045 (1917); Neumann v. Morse Dry Docks and Repair Co., 255 Fed.
97 (E. D., N. Y. 1918); Wetterer v. Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry., 277 Ill. App. 275
(1934).
2 P. L. N. C. 1933, c. 449.

